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THE THREAT OF EXPULSION AS UNACCEPTABLE
COERCION: TITLE IX, DUE PROCESS, AND
COERCED CONFESSIONS
ABSTRACT
The nation’s recent focus on the prevalence of sexual assault has rightfully
prompted colleges and universities to take a second look at their sexual assault
policies. Bringing justice to those who have committed sexual assault, and
violated schools’ codes of conduct, is worthy. However, one concern is that the
pendulum has swung too far to the left. Schools have instituted stricter policies
without considering the due process rights of the accused. Problematically, the
statements made by the accused, under limited due process safeguards, can be
used in criminal proceedings. This Comment argues that it is unconstitutional
to admit in a state criminal proceeding statements that were made by students
accused of sexual assault in a college disciplinary hearing. Specifically, it posits
that such statements can be considered coerced confessions in violation of due
process.
This Comment pays particular attention to the lack of safeguards present in
the college disciplinary process for adjudicating sexual misconduct. Pressure
from the Obama Administration for colleges and universities to transform their
sexual assault response procedures ushered in sweeping changes that paid little
attention to the accused student’s due process rights. This approach to college
sexual misconduct policies, while valuable for victim protection purposes, is
troublesome when the accused student is facing, or will later face, criminal
charges. This Comment argues that the threat of expulsion used by college
officials to elicit statements from an accused student is coercion that becomes
unconstitutional when a prosecutor seeks to admit the statements into evidence
in a criminal case.
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INTRODUCTION
Designing a sufficiently fair and appropriate structure for college and
university1 sexual misconduct proceedings has long been a unique challenge for
legal scholars and college officials seeking to ensure that both the complainant
and the accused are treated fairly and impartially.2 The prevalence of sexual
assault on college campuses has only heightened the need for colleges to ensure
that their procedures are adequate and efficient.3
Recently, Title IX has emerged as a salient tool for addressing sexual
violence on campus.4 Title IX is a federal law that provides, “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”5 Although Title IX
1 For purposes of this Comment, the terms “college” and “university” are treated identically and may be
used interchangeably. Where “school” is used, it refers to both a “college” and a “university.”
2 See, e.g., Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault
on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 79–80 (2013).
3 The rampancy of sexual assault on campuses is startling. While statistics on its frequency vary,
depending on study surveys’ targeted audiences, targeted behaviors, and definitions, for all entities involved, the
policy discussions report shockingly high numbers of sexual assault and misconduct behaviors. Tyler Kingkade,
Campus Rape May Be “Worse than We Thought,” Study Shows, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2015, 3:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/20/1-in-5-college-study-raped_n_7293068.html. For example, in one
study, 23.1% of female college students reported they experienced some form of unwanted sexual contact carried
out by force or incapacitation due to alcohol and drugs. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., WESTAT, REPORT ON THE AAU
CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 14 (2015), https://www.aau.edu/
uploadedFiles/AAU_Publications/AAU_Reports/Sexual_Assault_Campus_Survey/Report%20on%20the%20
AAU%20Campus%20Climate%20Survey%20on%20Sexual%20Assault%20and%20Sexual%20Misconduct.p
df. Additionally, women ages eighteen to twenty-four (the age range of most college students) have the highest
rate of sexual violence victimization among women generally and are “3 times more likely than women in
general to experience sexual violence.” Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://rainn.org/getinformation/statistics/sexual-assault-victims#College (last visited Feb. 21, 2016); SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN
LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION
AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013, at 1 (Jill Thomas & Lynne McConnell eds., 2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf. This problem does not only concern women. See Victims
of Sexual Violence: Statistics, supra. Male college students ages eighteen to twenty-four are five times more
likely than male nonstudents of the same age to be victims of rape or sexual assault. Id. Not surprisingly,
combatting sexual violence on college campuses became a significant focus of the Obama Administration and
garnered significant media and political attention in the last five years. See Elizabeth Hartfield, Obama Launches
New Effort Combating Sexual Assault on College Campuses, CNN (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2014/09/19/politics/obama-combating-campus-sexual-assault/; Jennifer Steinhauer, White House to Press
Colleges to Do More to Combat Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/us/
tougher-battle-on-sex-assault-on-campus-urged.html?_r=0.
4 See Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a Brick on the Other: Tilting the Scale Against
Males Accused of Sexual Assault in College Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 603–04 (2013)
(discussing the U.S. Department of Education’s interpretations of Title IX and how it will be enforced).
5 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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had not previously applied to campus policies on sexual violence, three new
documents ushered in sweeping changes: the U.S. Department of Education’s
Dear Colleague Letter (Dear Colleague Letter), the Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights’ Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence
(Questions and Answers), and the White House Task Force to Protect Students
from Sexual Assault’s Not Alone report.6 Many colleges and universities did not
comply with these requirements, causing the Department of Education (DOE)
to investigate over a hundred of them.7 Schools rushed to transform their policies
and procedures on sexual violence out of fear of losing federal funding.8
This Comment focuses on the collateral consequences of college disciplinary
proceedings, specifically the effect of these proceedings on the accused student’s
due process rights in a concurrent or subsequent criminal proceeding. In the
aftermath of the Title IX policy changes and the resulting transformation in
colleges’ sexual violence procedures—all of which sought to provide more
services and protections for identified victims of sexual violence9—little
attention has been paid to the effects of these policy changes on the
constitutional rights of accused students. Individual colleges and universities
have offered only minimal safeguards to accused students as their policies have
reformed.10 Only a few state legislatures are pushing for more protection of the
rights of the accused.11 This Comment argues that the lack of safeguards present
in the college disciplinary process taints the evidence that results from that
6

See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE FIRST
REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014) [hereinafter
NOT ALONE], https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/905942/download; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf; Russlynn Ali,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter
Ali, Dear Colleague Letter], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/dear_colleague_sexual_violence.pdf.
7 Tyler Kingkade, 106 Colleges Are Under Federal Investigation for Sexual Assault Cases, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/06/colleges-federal-investigation-titleix-106_n_7011422.html.
8 See Meredith Clark, Official to Colleges: Fix Sexual Assault or Lose Funding, MSNBC (July 15, 2014,
11:23
AM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/campus-sexual-assault-conference-dartmouth-college#51832
(stating that then-DOE Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Catherine Lhamon, threatened to cut funding for
schools that violate Title IX).
9 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 6; NOT ALONE, supra note 6; Ali, Dear
Colleague Letter, supra note 6.
10 See Ashe Schow, Hardly Any Mention of Due Process at Senate Hearing on Campus Sexual Assault,
WASH. EXAMINER (July 29, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/hardly-any-mention-of-dueprocess-at-senate-hearing-on-campus-sexual-assault/article/2569207.
11 Valerie Richardson, After UVA Fiasco, Some Colleges Consider Providing Lawyers to Students Accused
of Sex Assault, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/16/college-sexualassault-crackdown-sparks-effort-to-/?page=all.
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process. For that reason, it violates due process to allow statements of the
accused student to be used against him or her in a criminal proceeding.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the general college
disciplinary process for sexual assault complaints. First, this Part discusses
Title IX requirements that are applicable to all colleges and universities that
receive federal funding. Next, it details the three basic investigatory models that
are most commonly used by colleges and universities in responding to sexual
assault.
Part II identifies the various safeguards that are lacking in college and
university disciplinary procedures and explains how those deficiencies taint
statements made by the accused student. Next, this Part examines state
legislatures’ reactions to due process concerns, particularly the unwillingness of
states to mandate that colleges and universities provide certain due process
safeguards to accused students.
Part III provides the constitutional backdrop for the coerced confession
analysis. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of
allowing the statements made by an accused student during a college
disciplinary proceeding into a state criminal proceeding. In Colorado v.
Connelly,12 the Court insisted that “coercive police activity is a necessary
predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13 This Part argues
that the Connelly holding should be extended to recognize threats of expulsion
by school officials as a form of coercion.
Part IV discusses state court decisions about whether to interpret their own
constitutional due process provisions in a manner that is consistent with
Connelly, paying particular attention to those states that have rejected the U.S.
Supreme Court’s stingy approach in favor of a more generous due process
standard. This Part explores cases in which state courts have held, as a matter of
state law, that egregious police conduct is not a necessary predicate for finding
a due process violation because private parties can be sources of coercion. This
Part particularly considers workplace confession cases in which courts have held
that statements were coerced, despite the absence of egregious police activity,
based on a threat of firing by the employer. It argues that statements made by
accused students in campus disciplinary proceedings are similarly coerced if
12
13

479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 167.
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they are made under threats of expulsion. Lastly, this Part explains the
implications of holding that the use of such statements in a criminal proceeding
is unconstitutional.
I. THE COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
All public and private colleges and universities receiving federal financial
assistance are required to follow Title IX and its interpretations.14 Because
almost all colleges and universities receive federal financial assistance and thus
must comply with Title IX,15 certain aspects of sexual assault disciplinary
proceedings are common across institutions. Additionally, schools’ methods for
investigating and resolving sexual assault complaints share some features. This
Part first introduces Title IX and provides an overview of three of Title IX’s
interpreting documents: the Dear Colleague Letter, the Questions and Answers,
and the Not Alone report. Next, this Part discusses in detail Title IX’s
requirements for college sexual assault proceedings. Last, this Part describes the
three models that are generally used at colleges and universities to respond to
complaints of sexual violence.
A. Title IX and Recent Guidance Documents
Title IX provides a mechanism for the DOE to perform compliance reviews,
investigate individual complaints, and provide technical assistance.16 This
14

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL (2015) [hereinafter TITLE IX
LEGAL MANUAL], http://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix#III.%C2%A0%20Scope%20of%20Coverage.
16 See id. (noting that the federal agency that provides the financial assistance is the agency responsible for
enforcing Title IX); Susan Hanley Duncan, The Devil Is in the Details: Will the Campus SaVE Act Provide More
or Less Protection to Victims of Campus Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 448 (2014); Hendrix, supra note 4. The
enforcement mechanism for Title IX requirements is administrative in that federal agencies that distribute
education funding are responsible for establishing requirements and may enforce those requirements through
any lawful means, including the termination of funding. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012) (“Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected . . . by the termination of . . . assistance of such
program or activity . . . .”). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that Title IX is enforceable through a
private right of action, meaning that a student can bring suit against a school alleging that it did not comply with
Title IX. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (holding that a student could maintain her
private right of action against two universities for sex discrimination). Further, a school can be held liable for a
Title IX violation when it manifests “deliberate[] indifferen[ce] to known acts of sexual harassment by a teacher”
or “known acts of peer sexual harassment.” Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641, 648 (1999).
The Court noted that the appropriateness of a response may be different in a primary- or secondary-education
setting than in a college setting. Id. at 649. Based upon interpretation of DOE’s policy guidance, the:
15

[T]hree part test for evaluating the adequacy of a school’s response to peer sexual harassment [is]:
(1) whether the harassment impaired access to educational opportunities, (2) whether the school
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mechanism allows the DOE to review the policies and procedures of colleges
and universities to determine whether they are in compliance.17 Title IX requires
that agencies promulgate regulations to provide guidance to recipients of federal
financial assistance, including colleges and universities.18 In 2000, the DOJ and
twenty other agencies published a common rule to provide guidance for Title IX
compliance.19 Although the common rule touches on Title IX sexual harassment
law, the most recent, helpful guidance on Title IX compliance is found in the
Dear Colleague Letter, the Questions and Answers, and the Not Alone report.20
These three documents provide guidance to colleges and universities about and
suggestions for Title IX compliance.21
1. Dear Colleague Letter
In 2011, the DOE released the Dear Colleague Letter, an advisory letter to
college and university officials, as a guide to the DOE’s views of Title IX
compliance.22 In the Dear Colleague Letter, the DOE stated three notable
grievance procedure provisions. First, and for the first time, it mandated that

had actual or constructive notice of the harassment, and (3) whether the school took prompt and
effective action to remedy the harassment and prevent its recurrence.
Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 95, 102 (2010).
17 Susan Hanley Duncan, supra note 16, at 443, 448.
18 TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 15; see Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,858, 52,859 (Aug. 30, 2000)
(“The goal of Title IX is to ensure that Federal funds are not utilized for and do not support sex-based
discrimination, and that individuals have equal opportunities, without regard to sex, to pursue, engage or
participate in, and benefit from academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, employment, or other
educational programs or activities.”).
19 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 52,858.
20 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 6; NOT ALONE, supra note 6; Ali, Dear
Colleague Letter, supra note 6.
21 See supra note 20.
22 Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6. The Dear Colleague Letter defined sexual violence to include
“physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to
the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol” or is otherwise “unable to give consent to due to an intellectual or other
disability.” Id. at 1. This made it clear that acts such as “rape, sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual
coercion . . . are forms of sexual harassment covered under Title IX.” Id. at 1–2. The DOE reasoned that these
acts, regardless if they only occur once, are severe enough to create a hostile environment that limits a student’s
ability to participate or benefit from a school program and thus brings it within Title IX’s coverage of prohibition
against sexual harassment in educational programs. See id. at 3. The Dear Colleague Letter emphasized that a
single incident of sexual assault or rape was enough to implicate Title IX coverage by citing a number of cases
in which courts have held that the question of whether a hostile environment exists can be proven by a single
incident of sexual violence. Id. at 3 n.10.
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schools use the preponderance of the evidence standard for determining sexual
misconduct.23 Second, it required that anyone investigating or adjudicating
college sexual misconduct matters have specific training or experience
responding to sexual harassment and sexual violence reports.24 Third, it stated
that colleges should resolve complaints “timely,” noting that “a typical
investigation takes approximately 60 calendar days.”25
2. Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence
In April 2014, the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights issued a guidance document
titled Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence.26 The Questions
and Answers reiterated that schools are required to use the preponderance of the
evidence standard.27 Additionally, the Questions and Answers required
universities to do the following: take interim measures to ensure student safety28
and the complainant’s safety if law enforcement is pursuing a simultaneous
criminal investigation,29 if requested, make arrangements so that the
complainant and the accused are not present in the same room at the same time,30
and prohibit the questioning of a complainant about sexual interactions with
anyone other than the respondent.31
3. The Not Alone Report
A third document also guides colleges and universities in complying with
Title IX. In 2014, the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual
Assault issued a report entitled, Not Alone.32 The Not Alone report suggested
ways to reform policies to “give survivors more control”33 and to “[b]etter
[h]old[] [o]ffenders [a]ccountable.”34

23

See id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
25 Id.; see Djuna Perkins, Behind the Headlines: An Insider’s Guide to Title IX and the Student Discipline
Process for Campus Sexual Assaults, 59 BOS. B.J., at liv, lv (2015).
26 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 6.
27 Id. at 26.
28 See id. at 21.
29 See id. at 28.
30 Id. at 30.
31 Id. at 31.
32 NOT ALONE, supra note 6.
33 Id. at 3.
34 Id. at 14.
24
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Describing itself as offering its “first set of action steps and
recommendations,”35 the report outlined the White House Task Force’s four
major purposes: (1) “[i]dentify the scope of the problem on college campuses;”
(2) “[h]elp prevent campus sexual assault;” (3) “[h]elp schools respond
effectively when a student is assaulted; and” (4) “[i]mprove, and make more
transparent, the federal government’s enforcement efforts.”36 First, to identify
the scope of the problem, the report announced that the Task Force would
“provid[e] schools with a new toolkit for developing and conducting a climate
survey.”37 Second, to aid in prevention efforts, the report encouraged sexual
assault prevention strategies, including bystander intervention, particularly those
programs that engage men.38 Third, in regard to ensuring that schools’ responses
to sexual assaults are effective, the report emphasized instituting “confidential
advice and support” for victims, included a “checklist for schools to use in
drafting (or reevaluating) their own sexual misconduct policies,” and announced
that the DOJ would begin “assessing different models for investigating and
adjudicating sexual assault cases with an eye toward identifying best
practices.”39 Finally, in efforts to increase transparency and enforcement, the
White House Task Force promised to post enforcement data on its website and
provide information about how students can file a complaint if they think their
schools are not sufficiently responding to sexual assault.40 In addition, the report
stated the DOE would strengthen its enforcement procedures by “instituting time
limits on negotiating voluntary resolution agreements” with schools, among
other measures.41
B. Title IX Requirements for College and University Sexual Violence
Proceedings
Title IX requirements for college and university sexual violence proceedings
are collected from Title IX and administrative documents, including the
guidance documents discussed above. All colleges and universities are required
to “take immediate action to eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence,
and address its effects.”42 To that end, every college and university must have a
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 2–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6, at 4.
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set of procedures in place to respond to sexual assault complaints, although
colleges and universities are not required to adopt grievance procedures specific
to sexual violence.43 If a school relies on its ordinary student disciplinary
procedures to resolve a sexual violence complaint, the school’s Title IX
coordinator must review the procedures to ensure compliance with Title IX.44
A school’s grievance procedures must provide for “prompt and equitable
resolution of . . . complaints.”45 Colleges and universities are allowed under
federal law to use voluntary informal mechanisms, such as mediation, to resolve
some types of sexual harassment complaints, but they are not allowed to use
mediation to resolve sexual assault complaints.46 As part of their grievance
procedures, all colleges and universities must: provide notice to students and
employees of the procedures, including where complaints may be filed; apply
the procedures to complaints alleging harassment, including sexual assault,
“carried out by employees, students, or third parties”; provide “[a]dequate,
reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints”; provide the opportunity for
both the complainant and the accused to “present witnesses and other evidence”;
“[d]esignate reasonably prompt time frames for the major stages of the
complaint process”; and “assure[] [they will] take steps to prevent recurrence of
any harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the complainant and
others, if appropriate.”47
The “prompt and equitable resolution” of complaints includes the
requirement that colleges and universities must resolve complaints even if a
criminal investigation is simultaneously taking place.48 Once law enforcement
has completed the gathering of evidence in response to a criminal complaint,
schools must “promptly” resume their Title IX investigations.49 In addition, all
schools should notify complainants of their right to file criminal complaints, and
should not dissuade complainants from filing a police report.50
To make grievance procedures “equitable,” many colleges and universities
conduct investigations and hearings to determine whether sexual violence has

43

Id. at 8.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 9.
48 Id. at 10.
49 Id.
50 Id. Specifically, the Dear Colleague Letter emphasizes that schools should not tell the complainant that
it is “working toward a solution and instruct, or ask, the complainant to wait to file the report.” Id.
44
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occurred.51 To determine guilt, colleges and universities must use a
preponderance of the evidence standard.52 Additionally, all schools must provide
the complainant and the accused with access to any information that will be used
at the hearing.53 A school that provides an accused student with a pre-hearing
meeting, allows him to present character witnesses, or allows him to review the
complainant’s statement must make the same provisions for the complainant.54
Although sexual violence response procedures vary by college, they
generally include the following process. Once the school receives notice of
sexual violence,55 “it must take immediate and appropriate steps to
investigate.”56 The DOE requires each institution to designate a Title IX
Coordinator to oversee complaints, meet with students, and oversee problems
that arise during the review of complaints.57 A person affiliated with the school
then investigates the complaint and provides written notice to the complainant
and the accused of its outcome.58 The persons who conduct the investigation and
make factual findings and conclusions vary among schools, but there are three
dominant models, each explained in the following section.59
C. Three Common Investigatory Models
Most colleges and universities use one of three models for Title IX
investigations and proceedings: the traditional model, the single investigator
model, or the hybrid model.60
1. The Traditional Model
The traditional model involves a college hearing, where a “judicial board
hears a case . . . , makes a finding, and decides the sanction.”61 An investigation
51

Id.
Id. at 11.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 11–12.
55 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining that a school can receive notice
of an act of sexual violence in various ways: a student filing a grievance with or informing the school’s Title IX
coordinator; an individual reporting an incident to an employee or staff member; a teacher or dean witnessing
the sexual violence; or indirectly through sources such as a “member of the local community, social networking
sites, or the media”).
56 Id.
57 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (2017); see Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6, at 7.
58 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 6, at 12.
59 See Perkins, supra note 25, at lvi.
60 See id.
61 NOT ALONE, supra note 6, at 14.
52
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typically occurs prior to the hearing.62 Generally, there is either an
administrative hearing or a panel hearing; an administrative hearing most often
involves one adjudicator, while a panel hearing has at least three members.63
Both the complainant and the accused appear before the board.64 Some schools
have rightly put protections into place to prevent the complainant from being retraumatized.65
2. The Single Investigator Model
In contrast, the single investigator model, approved by the Not Alone
report,66 vests investigative authority in a single investigator rather than in a
board.67 This model removes the need for an in-person hearing.68 The
investigator conducts the entire disciplinary process by gathering all of the
evidence, interviewing witnesses, and issuing findings.69 Usually the
investigator notifies the accused student of basic details of the investigation in
writing.70 He then interviews the complainant, the accused student, and
witnesses using non-adversarial questioning intended to seek information
pertaining to both potential defenses for the accused student and support for the
complainant’s allegations.71 The investigator writes a report at the conclusion of
the investigation, outlining his findings and conclusions as applied to the
college’s sexual assault policy.72
3. The Hybrid Model
Finally, a hybrid model combines aspects from both the traditional model
and the single investigator model.73 Schools that adopt a hybrid model usually
divide responsibilities among different individuals.74 It is common in the hybrid

62 ASS’N FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMIN., STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATION & TITLE IX: GOLD
STANDARD PRACTICES FOR RESOLUTION OF ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 15
(2014), http://www.theasca.org/files/Publications/ASCA%202014%20Gold%20Standard.pdf.
63 Id.
64 See Perkins, supra note 25, at lvi.
65 Id.
66 NOT ALONE, supra note 6, at 3, 14; Perkins supra note 26, at lv.
67 Perkins, supra note 25, at lv–lvi.
68 ASS’N FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMIN., supra note 62, at 16.
69 Perkins, supra note 25, at lv.
70 Id.
71 Id. at lv–lvi.
72 Id. at lvi.
73 ASS’N FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMIN., supra note 62, at 16.
74 See id.
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model for a “single investigator [to] make[] a recommendation to a panel of
administrators . . . who make a final decision, sometimes meeting with the
investigator and the students separately.”75
Title IX’s requirements apply in full force regardless of which model a
college chooses to employ to investigate sexual assault. In other words, the
school’s compliance with Title IX is determined not by which investigatory
model it chooses but by whether the school has taken steps to meet the
requirements of Title IX and its guidance documents.
The Dear Colleague Letter, the Questions and Answers, and the Not Alone
report required more specific and perhaps stricter methods of compliance and
transformed the ways in which colleges and universities across the country
respond to sexual misconduct. These newly changed policies bring serious
questions concerning the lack of due process safeguards for accused students.
II. LACK OF SAFEGUARDS IN COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND
EFFORTS TO PROTECT DUE PROCESS
In light of the recent focus on the mounting evidence of sexual assaults on
college campuses, due process safeguards for the accused student were rarely
considered, if considered at all, when colleges and universities reformed their
policies to meet the newly announced requirements of Title IX compliance.76
First, this Part explains, from a due process standpoint, several pivotal
safeguards that are missing from many colleges’ disciplinary proceedings. Next,
this Part discusses the minimal attention given by state legislatures to protect the
due process rights of accused students.
A. Lack of Safeguards
When faced with claims that a college or university failed to provide an
accused student due process during the disciplinary proceeding, courts have
repeatedly asserted that school disciplinary proceedings are not meant to mirror
criminal proceedings.77 For that reason, accused students do not have the same
75

Perkins, supra note 25, at lvi.
See Schow, supra note 10.
77 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (noting the complications with requiring school
proceedings to be more like court proceedings); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14–16 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting that the same procedures are not required in school disciplinary proceedings as in criminal proceedings);
Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D. Me. 2005) (“A university is not a court of law . . . .”). In
addition, private universities are not state actors and thus need not afford students constitutional protection.
76
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due process rights in a college disciplinary proceeding as defendants do in a
criminal proceeding.78 Even if this is true with respect to the legality of the
disciplinary proceeding, the lack of due process protection must be considered
when the prosecution wants to admit statements made by the accused student
into evidence in a state criminal proceeding.
At the outset, many colleges refuse to allow the accused student to seek
representation by an attorney.79 The Dear Colleague Letter mandates that “if a
school chooses to allow the parties to have their lawyers participate in the
proceedings, it must do so equally for both parties.”80 At most schools that allow
legal counsel to be present, the schools do not allow them to speak on behalf of
the student.81 The denial of counsel has serious consequences for the due process
rights of the accused student when he or she faces a concurrent or subsequent
criminal proceeding.82 Advice of counsel is especially important when a student
risks not just the loss of a college degree, but also the loss of liberty as a result
of criminal punishment through sentencing.
In addition to lack of counsel, accused students face self-incrimination
concerns.83 At least in public colleges and universities, an accused student can
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and choose to remain silent
during the disciplinary proceeding, but doing so can be used to prove one’s
guilt.84 For private colleges, there is no self-incrimination right.85 Students have
to cooperate. Accused students therefore face a troubling dilemma: they can
either actively defend themselves and risk making incriminating statements and
exposing their cases to the criminal prosecutor, or they can remain silent in the

However, private actors who act at the behest of the government or who perform traditional government
functions are subject to constitutional restraints. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352
(1974).
78 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 15–16.
79 See Judith Shulevitz, Accused College Rapists Have Rights, Too, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2014),
http://newrepublic.com/article/119778/college-sexual-assault-rules-trample-rights-accused-campus-rapists.
80 Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6, at 12.
81 Shulevitz, supra note 79.
82 See Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived “Catch-22”: Providing Fairness to Both the Accused
and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 277, 290
(2009).
83 Paul E. Rosenthal, Note, Speak Now: The Accused Student’s Right to Remain Silent in Public University
Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1997).
84 See generally id. (discussing the limitations of the privilege against self-incrimination for accused
students in disciplinary hearings).
85 See id. at 1253 n.65 (explaining that the Due Process Clause applies to public, not private, colleges and
universities).
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school disciplinary hearings, most likely resulting in expulsion.86 The
cooperative communication and relationship between schools and law
enforcement only exacerbates this dilemma for students who might be
criminally charged if the university finds them guilty at the university
proceeding.87 Moreover, even if schools and law enforcement do not cooperate
with each other, Title IX proceedings can be subpoenaed and the accused
student’s statements turned over to the prosecution in a criminal proceeding.88
In addition to the problems associated with a lack of opportunity to be
represented by counsel and to remain silent, three guidelines set out in the Dear
Colleague Letter are of particular concern in light of the possibility that an
accused student could later face charges in a criminal proceeding: (1) the
requirement that colleges use the preponderance of the evidence standard;89 (2)
the DOE’s position that colleges should not allow an accused student to crossexamine the complainant;90 and (3) the requirement that if the school offers an
appeals process that it does so for both parties.91
1. The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard
First, the requirement that colleges use the preponderance of the evidence
standard92 to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused student makes it more
likely that the accused student will offer statements that could be selfincriminating than if a higher standard were used.93 The claimant is only

86 See Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for
“Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 691 (2001).
87 James M. Picozzi, Note, University Disciplinary Process: What’s Fair, What’s Due, and What You
Don’t Get, 96 YALE L.J. 2132, 2153–54 (1987).
88 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9)(i) (2017).
89 Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6, at 11.
90 Id. at 12 (“Allowing an alleged perpetrator to question an alleged victim directly may be traumatic or
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.”).
91 Id.
92 Before 2011 and the release of the Dear Colleague Letter, many schools used higher standards of proof,
such as clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt. These standards were criticized for being too
favorable to the accused and perpetuating the presumption that all sex is consensual. Perkins, supra note 25, at
liv–lv.
93 See Rosenthal, supra note 85, at 1251–52 (explaining that colleges are free to use evidence standards
that are looser than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and that accused students may be compelled to testify
or risk expulsion); see also Hendrix, supra note 4, at 613. Hendrix argues that the preponderance of the evidence
standard is the most troubling requirement present in the Dear Colleague Letter. Id. at 610. He finds fault in the
DOE’s reasoning to mandate the preponderance of the evidence standard so that grievance procedures will be
consistent with Title IX standards in other contexts. Id. Hendrix rightly points out that the issues being decided
when the DOE evaluates a school’s compliance are extremely distinct from issues decided in college disciplinary
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required to prove that it is more likely than not that the act of sexual violence
happened, so accused students who remain silent during an investigation are
more likely to be found guilty.94 More specifically, because students face
sanctions for not talking during the proceeding,95 the preponderance of the
evidence standard gives accused students the incentive to talk in an effort to
defend themselves, which can lead to self-incriminating statements that can be
used by a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding.96 The incentive to talk is only
exacerbated by the heavy threat of expulsion that looms as punishment for
students found guilty.97
2. Cross-Examination
Second, the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights’ (OCR) strong position about
whether colleges should allow the accused student the opportunity to crossexamine his or her accuser98 prevents the accused student from revealing
inconsistencies or motives to lie in the complainant’s testimony.99 Some law
review articles have argued, and courts have agreed, that the right to confront
one’s accuser is a procedural due process requirement in sexual assault
disciplinary hearings.100 Because the question of whether sexual violence
occurred often turns on heavy disputes of fact, the repercussions of not allowing
a student accused of sexual violence to cross-examine his or her accuser include
the inability to uncover biased, untruthful, incomplete, and inaccurate
allegations.101

proceedings. Id. Further, he argues, requiring the same standard of proof for both situations is “illogical given
the different implications and ramifications of each type of situation.” Id.
94 Rosenthal, supra note 85, at 1252.
95 Id. at 1277.
96 Rosenthal, supra note 85, at 1252; see also Hendrix, supra note 4, at 610–15. Hendrix argues that
accused students should be afforded at least the protection of a clear and convincing burden of proof. Id. at 612.
Any lesser standard, he argues, does not comply with due process. Id. at 611–15. Hendrix notes the obvious and
severe reputational harm to the accused student and the stigmatization from the charge alone are appropriate
reasons for requiring a higher burden of proof. Id. at 612.
97 See id. at 613 (“Because the penalty for those found guilty is usually expulsion, the private interests at
stake are significant.”).
98 Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6, at 12.
99 See Hendrix, supra note 4, at 615–18.
100 Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987); Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147
(N.D.N.Y. 1997); Hendrix, supra note 4, at 615–16; Tenerowicz, supra note 86, at 690.
101 See Hendrix, supra note 4, at 617.
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3. Appeal
Third, the requirement that the complainant be given the chance to appeal a
finding that the accused student is innocent will require the accused student to
defend himself or herself a second time.102 Not only could any statement made
in the accused’s defense potentially be self-incriminating if used against him or
her in a subsequent criminal proceeding, it could also encourage the accused
student to remain silent and almost ensure a guilty finding.103 The opportunity
for the complainant to appeal the accused student’s innocence subjects the
accused to coercion a second time.
B. Policymakers’ Response to Tougher Sexual Violence Policies
Like colleges, many state legislatures have pushed for harsher proceedings
for the accused. Their response stems, at least in part, from national attention
garnered from high-profile incidents and the Obama Administration’s
illumination of the sexual assault prevalence on college campuses.104 Their
endeavors focus on varying facets of the disciplinary process, including proof of
consent, mandatory sentencing, and mandatory transcript reporting.105
1. Affirmative Consent
Several states, including Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
and North Carolina, are pushing affirmative consent laws to require accused
students at public colleges and universities to prove that the complainant
consented to the sexual activity (rather than requiring the school to prove nonconsent).106 The National Center for Higher Risk Management estimates that
about 800 schools have adopted variations of affirmative consent policies.107
Affirmative consent policies are a concern for accused students who may
later face criminal charges for the same act. Similar to the problems that
accompany the denial of counsel to an accused student during the disciplinary
102 See id. at 619–20 (noting that one adjudication results in less of a chance of the accused being found
guilty erroneously).
103 Rosenthal, supra note 83, at 1252; see Tenerowicz, supra note 86, at 691.
104 Joseph O’Sullivan, State Lawmakers Address Sexual Violence on Campuses, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 26,
2015, 8:43 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/state-lawmakers-address-sexualviolence-on-campuses/; see also Richardson, supra note 11 (noting that universities are “under pressure from
the Obama administration to prove they’re clamping down on sexual assault”).
105 See A.B. 967, 2015 Cal. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 3–4 (Cal. 2015); Richardson, supra note 11.
106 Richardson, supra note 11.
107 See id.
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proceeding, requiring the accused student to affirmatively prove that the
complainant consented to the activity shifts the burden of proof onto the accused
student.108 The student is again faced with the dilemma of either defending
himself or herself in the school disciplinary proceeding and potentially handing
over details and incriminating statements to the criminal prosecutor, or
remaining silent during the disciplinary proceeding, which often leads to a
finding of liability because the student cannot meet the burden of proof.109
Common punishments for liability are mandatory long-term suspension and
expulsion.110
2. Mandatory Sentencing
Some states are considering mandatory sentencing as an appropriate
response to the sexual assault problem on college campuses.111 For example,
California has proposed a bill that would require at least a two-year suspension
for students found guilty of forcible sexual violence.112
3. Mandatory Transcript Reporting
Other state legislatures are pushing for mandatory reporting of the accused
student’s guilt on academic transcripts.113 Virginia and New York require
colleges to note on transcripts whether a student was suspended or expelled
because of sexual misconduct, turning school transcripts into a “sex-offender
registry.”114
4. National Response
On a national level, congressional action also seems to be following the
Obama Administration’s lead toward tougher sexual assault policies, further
eroding due process rights for the accused.115 The Campus Accountability and
Safety Act, for example, introduced by the U.S. Senate in February 2015, sought
to require colleges and universities that receive federal funding to share

108

Schow, supra note 10.
See Tenerowicz, supra note 86, at 691.
110 See id. at 691–92.
111 See Richardson, supra note 11.
112 A.B. 967, 2015 Cal. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 4 (Cal. 2015).
113 See Jake New, Requiring a Red Flag, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 10, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2015/07/10/states-requiring-colleges-note-sexual-assault-responsibility-student-transcripts.
114 Id.
115 See Schow, supra note 10.
109
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information about sexual violence with local law enforcement agencies.116 On
July 29, 2015, in a Senate committee hearing, senators’ discussions mostly
focused on providing easier reporting access for complainants with minimal
proposed reforms to ensure adequate procedure for accused students.117
With little protection offered in school disciplinary proceedings by
individual colleges and universities and minimal protection required by federal
and state laws, the due process rights of accused students are extremely
vulnerable in a concurrent or subsequent criminal proceeding. Because school
disciplinary proceedings offer so few safeguards to accused students and tilt the
balance in favor of the complainant, allowing the accused student’s statements
into a criminal proceeding is a due process violation.
III. COERCED CONFESSION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of allowing
into a state criminal proceeding the statements made by an accused student
during a college disciplinary proceeding. While in Colorado v. Connelly,118 the
Court insisted that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the
finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”119 this Part argues that the
Connelly holding should be extended to allow threats of expulsion by school
officials to be recognized as a form of coercion. This Part begins with a
discussion of a line of cases leading up to Colorado v. Connelly. Next, this Part
details the Connelly Court’s facts, holding, and reasoning. Last, this Part argues
that the Connelly holding should be extended to allow threats of expulsion by
school officials to be recognized as a form of coercion that may violate an
accused student’s due process.

116

S. 590, 114th Cong. (2015).
See Schow, supra note 10; see also Reauthorizing the Higher Education Act: Combating Campus Sexual
Assault Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015)
(testimony of Senator Claire McCaskill) (“Not only would the Confidential Advisor coordinate support services
for survivors, they would also provide critical information about options for reporting these crimes to campus
authorities and/or local law enforcement.”); id. (testimony of Senator Dean Heller) (“I believe the Campus
Accountability and Safety Act is a step in the right direction towards combating this heinous crime and
guaranteeing survivors have access to the resources they need and deserve.”).
118 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
119 Id. at 167.
117
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A. History
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state practice that “deprive[s] any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”120 In 1936, the
Supreme Court applied the due process involuntariness doctrine for confessions
for the first time in Brown v. Mississippi.121 Ellington, a black man accused of
murder, was twice hung to a tree and repeatedly whipped by law enforcement
officers.122 Brown and Shields, two other black defendants, were stripped, laid
over chairs, and repeatedly struck with buckles on a leather strap.123 The beatings
continued until each defendant agreed to confess in a manner dictated by the
police.124 These confessions were each introduced at trial, and each defendant
was convicted and sentenced to die.125 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme
Court upheld the convictions.126 But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the due process clause prohibits state criminal trials from using confessions
that were made involuntarily.127
By the 1960s, the Court was interested in balancing an individual’s right to
make rational choices motivated by a free will with society’s interest in “prompt
and efficient law enforcement.”128 However, this balancing and the totality of
the circumstances test utilized by the Court made relief under the due process
voluntariness doctrine uncertain.129 The Court continued to recognize due
process violations when state officers physically abused suspects to garner
confessions. Additionally, the doctrine was extended to cover some forms of
psychological pressure.130 Yet the Court also began relying on the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel131 and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

120

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
297 U.S. 278 (1936); Scott A. McCreight, Comment, Colorado v. Connelly: Due Process Challenges to
Confessions and Evidentiary Reliability Interests, 73 IOWA L. REV. 207, 210 (1987).
122 Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
123 Id. at 282.
124 Id. at 282.
125 Id. at 284.
126 Id. at 279–80.
127 Id. at 286.
128 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959); McCreight, supra note 121, at 211.
129 McCreight, supra note 121, at 211–12.
130 See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564–65, 568 (1958) (holding that a confession was coerced when
police threatened defendant with a fifth grade education that he would be lynched unless he confessed).
131 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is applicable to states through fundamental fairness of due process).
121
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incrimination132 to aid in the confession analysis. Between the mid-1960s and
1986, few cases addressed—and little scholarly writing appeared on—the
voluntariness doctrine.133 In 1986, however, the Court granted review of a case
involving a voluntariness question which, for the first time, provided what
seemed to be a threshold requirement for a confession due process violation.134
B. Colorado v. Connelly: The Predicate Finding of Law Enforcement
Coercion
In Colorado v. Connelly, the Supreme Court announced that police
misconduct is necessary for a finding that the use of a coerced confession
violates the due process rights of the speaker.135 In that case, Connelly
approached a police officer and, without any prompting, told him that he had
murdered someone and wanted to talk about it.136 The police officer advised
Connelly of his Miranda rights.137 Connelly said that he understood the rights
but still wanted to talk about the murder, assuring the police officer after
questioning that he had not been drinking or taking any drugs.138 Connelly then
told the officer that he had been a patient in several mental hospitals in the
past.139 The officer told Connelly that he was under no obligation to say
anything, and Connelly replied that it was “all right” and he would talk to the
officer because his conscience had been bothering him.140 The officer testified
that Connelly appeared to understand fully the nature of his acts.141
Later, a homicide detective arrived, advised Connelly of his Miranda rights,
and asked him “what he had on his mind.”142 Connelly stated that he had traveled
all the way from Boston to Denver to confess to the murder of a young girl whom
he had killed in Denver.143 He gave details of his story to the officers and agreed

132

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (noting inherent coercion when an individual is
interrogated while in custody); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
includes Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
133 McCreight, supra note 121, at 213.
134 Id.
135 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
136 Id. at 160.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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to take the officers to the scene of the killing.144 Under Connelly’s direction, the
officers took Connelly in a police vehicle to the location of the crime, where
Connelly pointed out the exact location of the murder.145 The homicide detective
perceived no indication that Connelly was suffering from a mental illness.146
After being held overnight, Connelly became visibly disoriented during an
interview with the public defender the next morning.147 He gave confused
answers to questions.148 For the first time, he stated that “voices” had told him
to travel from Boston to Denver and that he had followed the directions of the
voices in confessing.149 Connelly was sent to a state hospital for evaluation.150
He was initially found incompetent to assist in his own defense by a state
hospital, but doctors subsequently determined that he was competent to proceed
to trial.151
At a hearing on the admissibility of Connelly’s statements, a psychiatrist
employed by the state hospital testified that Connelly was suffering from chronic
schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at least as of the day before he
confessed.152 The psychiatrist’s interviews with Connelly revealed that Connelly
was following the “voice of God.”153 This voice instructed Connelly to withdraw
money from the bank, to buy an airplane ticket, and to fly from Boston to
Denver.154 After arriving in Denver, Connelly perceived the “voice” becoming
stronger; it told him to confess the killing to police officers or to kill himself.155
The defense expert witness testified that these “command hallucinations”
interfered with Connelly’s “ability to make free and rational choices.”156
Both the Colorado state trial court and the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the suppression of the statements was appropriate under the Due Process
Clause.157 Although the trial court found there was no police misconduct, it ruled
that Connelly’s mental illness deprived him of the “free will” required to make
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
Id. at 160–61.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 162.
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a confession.158 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the suppression order on
two lines of reasoning.159 First, the court held that the statements made to the
officer before the arrest were involuntary and therefore inadmissible under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.160 Second, the court ruled
that the statements made following the arrest were also inadmissible because the
state failed to show that Connelly had validly waived his privilege against selfincrimination.161
In reversing the Colorado Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced that coercive governmental conduct was a prerequisite to a finding
of involuntariness, and that no such conduct had occurred during Connelly’s first
confession to the police officer.162 The Court rejected the trial court’s view that
the statements should be suppressed because Connelly’s illness destroyed his
volition and compelled him to confess, therefore rendering the statements
involuntary.163 The Court also rejected the Colorado Supreme Court’s finding
that the admission of the confession into evidence in state court was sufficient
state action, faulting such reasoning as failing to live up to the line of
“voluntariness” cases that demonstrated an “essential link between coercive
activity of the State, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant,
on the other.”164
The Court supported its new requirement for police coercion by first noting
that police misconduct had been present in every voluntariness case before the
Court in the last fifty years.165 The Court recognized that other factors in each of
the cases had aggravated the extent of coerciveness but emphasized that, absent
coercive behavior by the police, no sufficient state action exists to support a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.166 The Court justified its
requirement of governmental misconduct by underscoring that police
overreaching was not only present in precedent cases, but that it was the
necessary element that rendered confessions coerced in violation of due
process.167 The Court went further, in dicta, stating that even “[t]he most
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id.
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163–64.
Id. at 164–65.
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outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a
defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause.”168
C. A Critique of Connelly
By announcing the threshold requirement of police misconduct, the Court in
Connelly did not overturn prior precedent. As the Court noted, each earlier case
contained some amount of police overreaching. However, the Connelly decision
did significantly narrow the broad language of early 1960s opinions, which
focused on “rational choice” and “free will” of the individual.169
A strong dissent argued that admitting the involuntary confession of a
mentally ill person is “antithetical to the notion of fundamental fairness
embodied in the Due Process Clause.”170 The dissent rejected the requirement
of police coercion, agreeing with the Colorado Supreme Court that the state
action requirement for a due process claim was fulfilled by the action of the state
trial court in admitting the confession evidence.171
Scholarly writing that followed Connelly critiqued the decision for being
unnecessarily broad and for deviating from precedent and the values of the due
process voluntariness doctrine.172 An article by the Harvard Law Review
Association, written shortly after Connelly, contended that the state’s use of
confessions coerced by even private parties is fundamentally unfair.173 It argued
that the decision was wrong to declare that police coercion can be the only source
for a coerced confession because any person who coerces a confession overrides
an individual’s free will, and the state “participates in that violation” by
admitting those coerced statements into state court as evidence.174
A Texas Law Review article, in addition to condemning the Connelly
majority for being too quick to dismiss the reliability of confessions as a due
process concern,175 argued that Connelly departed from a major premise of
168

Id. at 166.
McCreight, supra note 121, at 216–17.
170 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 180.
172 See, e.g., George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court
Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 289 (1988); Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Right Against Self-Incrimination—
Involuntary Confessions, 101 HARV. L. REV. 179 (1987).
173 Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 172, at 186–87.
174 Id.
175 Dix, supra note 172, at 274–76.
169
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federal constitutional law.176 The article noted that the Connelly Court deviated
from the Court’s previously held interpretation that the admissibility of a
confession depends, under the totality of the circumstances, on the defendant’s
free will and rational choice; instead, the Court embraced a test in which the
totality of the circumstances is not relevant at all unless the court first finds
coercive police activity.177 The article correctly points out that if the only
purpose of federal constitutional law is to control official activity that threatens
due process interests, private coercion may be irrelevant to the admissibility of
an accused person’s statements.178 However, as the article notes, if due process
protects a defendant’s interest in trial accuracy, as it should, it should not matter
whether the source of coercion was governmental or private.179
Certainly some form of state action is required for the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply,180 but the Court wrongfully concluded
police conduct was the only state action that would have been sufficient to
support Connelly’s claim. As the dissent’s approach acknowledged,181 the state
itself supplies the needed state action when it, acting in an adversarial role,
introduces evidence into trial that is not the product of the rational choice and
free will of the individual.182
If courts are unwilling to limit the holding of Connelly to cases involving
confessions of mentally ill persons, this Comment urges state courts to reject the
broad implications and limits on due process of the Connelly holding.183 Instead,
they should read into their state constitutions and statutory provisions a more
generous due process voluntariness standard to protect the accused from
egregious coercion, even if it is not caused by police misconduct.

176

Id. at 289.
Id.
178 Id. at 303.
179 Id.
180 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 348 n.2 (1974) (“Because of
our conclusion on the threshold question of state action, we do not reach the questions relating to the . . .
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” (emphasis added)).
181 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 180 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182 See Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (enforcing a racist real covenant constituted state action).
183 Although Connelly is a constitutional decision and thus binds states by way of the Supremacy Clause,
the case establishes a floor, not a ceiling. Thus, states are free to provide more protection than the U.S.
Constitution requires.
177

MCGOWAN GALLEYPROOFS2

1200

5/30/2017 11:35 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1175

IV. STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED AS COERCED CONFESSIONS
Some state courts seem to implicitly criticize Connelly’s departure from the
values of rational choice and free will underlying the due process voluntariness
standard.184 They have ignored or rejected Connelly’s requirement of official
police coercion in favor of a more liberal due process standard.185 This Part
begins with a discussion of state court decisions that have held confessions to be
involuntary as a violation of due process even where there was no evidence of
police wrongdoing. Next, this Part examines the issue of coercion in workplace
confessions made under the threat of termination or demotion. It argues that
statements made by accused students in college sexual assault hearings are
similarly coerced if made under the threat of expulsion. Last, this Part provides
some implications of holding that the use of such statements in a criminal
proceeding is unconstitutional.
A. The Effects of Connelly in State Court
States inconsistently apply Connelly to cases involving confessions coerced
by private action.186 Some state courts have held that statements made to police
after a defendant’s family member visited with him were admissible because the
family member was not acting as a “police instrumentality.”187 For that reason,
a confession resulting from coercion by a defendant’s wife, for example, was
admissible.188 Other state courts have declined to decide issues based on
Connelly,189 acknowledging that statements coerced by private citizens can
render such statements involuntary and inadmissible.190 The following case is
illustrative of those in which state courts have held that police misconduct was
not a necessary predicate for finding a due process violation.

184 See Howard v. State, 515 So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Bowe, 881 P.2d 538, 544 (Haw.
1994); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 752 (La. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Sorbo, 649 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319–20 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996).
185 Howard, 515 So. 2d at 430 (“[I]nvoluntary confessions or admissions given to private persons are
inadmissible in Florida courts.”); Bowe, 881 P.2d at 545 (rejecting “the Supreme Court’s narrow focus on police
coercion in Connelly and hold[ing] that the protections under. . . the Hawai’i Constitution are broader”); Martin,
645 So. 2d at 754 (interpreting that a state statute “mandate[d] the requirement that all confessions, regardless
of whether a state actor is involved, must be proven to be voluntary”); Sorbo, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (“[I]t has
long been the law in New York that a Defendant’s involuntary statement, whether obtained by the police or a
private individual, may not be used against him or her.”).
186 Bowe, 881 P.2d at 543.
187 Id. (citing People v. Whitehead, 508 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ill.), cert denied 484 U.S. 933 (1987)).
188 Id. (citing Darghty v. State, 530 So. 2d 27, 31 (Miss. 1988)).
189 Id. (citing Illinois v. Bernasco, 541 N.E.2d 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
190 Id. (citing People v. Seymour, 470 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)).
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In State v. Bowe,191 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the coercive
conduct of a private person was sufficient to render a confession inadmissible.192
A brawl that resulted in injuries occurred on a university campus.193 Afterwards,
a police officer contacted the head coach of the university’s basketball team to
request his assistance in making arrangements for the police to interview
members of the basketball team that were suspected of being involved in the
fight.194 The coach later told the defendant he needed to go to the police station
for an interview and that he would accompany the defendant.195 The defendant
and the coach both went to the police station, where the defendant waived his
constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent.196
The lower court found that the defendant’s statement to the police was not
the product of his rational intellect and free will because he feared that if he did
not follow his coach’s direction, he would be suspended from the basketball
team, and therefore the statement was not voluntary.197 The court did not rule on
whether the basketball coach exercised state police power when instructing the
defendant to go to the police station, but rather considered him to be a private
person.198
Whether coercive conduct of a private person is sufficient to render a
confession involuntary was a case of first impression for Hawaii199 The Hawaii
Supreme Court rejected Connelly, accusing the U.S. Supreme Court of
“limit[ing] the interests protected by federal constitutional confession law.”200
Instead, the Hawaii Supreme Court held, as a matter of Hawaii constitutional
law, that coercive behavior by a private person may be sufficient to render a
defendant’s confession involuntary.201

191

Id. at 538.
Id. at 547.
193 Id. at 540.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 540–41.
199 Id. at 541.
200 Id. at 544.
201 Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court also condemned the confession under the Hawaii Constitution’s selfincrimination provision. Id. The court, quoting State v. Kelekolio, stated that “[t]he constitutional right against
self-incrimination prevents the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s extrajudicial admissions of guilt where such
admissions are the product of coercion.” Id. (quoting State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 69 (1993)). The Hawaii
Supreme Court interpreted a broader right against self-incrimination and refused to limit that right to government
coercion. Id.
192
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In doing so, the court found a broader due process right in the Hawaii
Constitution than Connelly recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment,202 noting
that one of the basic considerations underlying exclusion of coerced confessions
is the “inherent untrustworthiness of involuntary confessions.”203 The Hawaii
Supreme Court echoed the Connelly dissent’s argument about the importance of
reliability when evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding a
confession.204
In refusing to limit the Due Process Clause of the Hawaii Constitution to
mirror Connelly’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,205 the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Bowe noted that the Due Process Clause serves to “protect the
right of [the] accused in a criminal case to a fundamentally fair trial,”206 which
implicitly includes the “right to make a meaningful choice between confessing
and remaining silent.”207 The court recognized that some state action was
required to support a claim for a due process violation, but refused to narrow
that focus to police coercion.208 Instead, the court, using the Connelly dissent to
buttress its reasoning, found that the state participates in the due process
violation when it admits the coerced statements as evidence.209
If the U.S. Supreme Court is unwilling to constrain Connelly, it is imperative
that states follow Hawaii’s trend to interpret their respective state constitutional
provisions more generously. In a state that adheres to the strict Connelly
approach, the threat of expulsion that looms if the student does not actively
defend himself or herself could be coercive enough to prevent his or her
exercising rational choice and free will about whether to speak, but still
considered voluntary because the statements were not coerced by the police.

202

Id. at 545.
Id. at 544 (quoting Kelekolio, 849 P.2d at 69).
204 Id. at 545; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 181 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Connelly majority was concerned with reliability but thought that state evidentiary law was more apt to
determine reliability. Id. at 167.
205 Bowe, 881 P.2d at 545.
206 Id. at 546 (quoting State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (Haw. 1990)).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 546–47.
203
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B. Issue of Workplace Threat of Termination as Analogous to College
Officials’ Threat of Expulsion
Students accused of sexual assault in college disciplinary proceedings face
similar obstacles to at-will employees investigated for crimes in their workplace.
The coercion of confessions by employers and employer-hired private
investigators is a growing phenomenon.210 Although few U.S. Supreme Court
cases have focused on coerced confessions in the workplace, the lower courts’
treatment of these confessions can shed light on the unfairness of confessions
under conditions similar to the duress experienced in the college disciplinary
process.
In Commonwealth v. Miller,211 a Massachusetts appellate court found that
the admission of an employee’s confession elicited by private individuals
employed as investigators by the defendant’s employer might yield a
constitutional violation.212 Although the defendant was not specifically
threatened with termination, the investigators informed her that she could be
separated from her child if she did not cooperate.213 The court noted that
admitting a confession improperly elicited is a violation of due process, even if
private individuals coerced the confession.214
The U.S. Supreme Court has showed an interest in condemning threats of
termination to elicit self-incriminating statements in the public sector.215 In
Garrity v. New Jersey,216 police officers who were being investigated were given
the choice either to incriminate themselves or to forfeit their jobs.217 The Court
held that, where the officers chose to make confessions, the confessions were
not voluntary but coerced, and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the use of
the statements in subsequent criminal proceedings.218 In short, Garrity prohibits
the prosecution from introducing statements made by government employees

210 See Saul Elbein, When Employees Confess, Sometimes Falsely, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/business/when-employees-confess-sometimes-falsely.html?_r=0
(discussing the increasing trend of employer internal investigators’ use of police interrogation methods, resulting
in false confessions due to the threat of termination).
211 865 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
212 Id. at 843–44.
213 Id. at 840–41.
214 Id. at 843.
215 E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499–500 (1967).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 494–95.
218 Id. at 500.
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who have been threatened with adverse employment action for failure to
voluntarily answer questions by the employer.219
Similar to Garrity, the U.S. Supreme Court in Uniformed Sanitation Men
Ass’n v. Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New York,220 held that a
discharge of city sanitation department employees violated constitutional
privilege.221 In the case, fifteen employees were investigated by the
Commissioner of Investigation of New York City on allegations that the
employees were not charging “proper fees for use of certain city facilities and
were diverting to themselves the proceeds of fees that they did charge.”222 Each
employee was summoned before the Commissioner and advised that if he
refused to testify with respect to his official conduct or the official conduct of
any other city employee on the grounds of self-incrimination, he would be
terminated.223 Twelve employees refused to testify, asserting the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, and were dismissed explicitly on that
ground.224 The Court, holding that the employees’ dismissal violated the
Constitution,225 reasoned that the employees were entitled to remain silent
because it was clear that New York was seeking not merely to investigate “their
use or abuse of their public trust” but to elicit testimony from the employees that
could be used to prosecute them criminally.226 The Court noted that employees
“subject themselves to dismissal if they refuse to account for their performance
of their public trust, after proper proceedings, which do not involve an attempt
to coerce them to relinquish their constitutional rights.”227
Relying on Uniformed Sanitation Men I, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in
Kalkines v. United States228 promulgated the Kalkines warning, which requires
that a government employer notify an employee who is compelled to make
potentially incriminating statements in an administrative investigation that his
statements cannot be used against him in a criminal prosecution.229 In Kalkines,
plaintiff Kalkines worked for the Bureau of Customs for the Treasury

219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 499–500.
392 U.S. 280 (1968).
Id. at 284–85.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 285.
473 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
See id. at 1398.
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Department until he was suspended and subsequently discharged for his alleged
failure to answer the Bureau’s questions relating to the performance of his duties
in four separate interviews.230 Importantly, for all or most of the interviews, the
DOJ was concurrently conducting a criminal investigation against Kalkines
relating to the alleged misconduct that was of concern in the administrative
investigation.231 The court ruled that Kalkines’s discharge was invalid,232
holding that a government employee can be removed for not answering his
employer’s questions, but only “if he is adequately informed both that he is
subject to discharge for not answering and that his replies (and their fruits)
cannot be employed against him in a criminal case.”233
The threat of termination or removal from office is akin to the threat of
expulsion from a college or university as a method to coerce self-incriminating
statements from an accused person. Just as the employee’s “option to lose [his]
means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis
of free choice to speak out or remain silent,”234 so, too, is the student’s option to
lose access to education when choosing to remain silent rather than speak out.
Without the institution of more adequate safeguards in the disciplinary process,
courts should hold it a violation of due process for statements compelled under
the threat of expulsion to be used against the accused student in a subsequent
criminal proceeding.
C. Implications
If the Court were to expand Connelly to hold that confessions made under
the threat of expulsion in college proceedings are involuntary under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, or if more states were to hold it a
violation of their state constitutions’ due process clauses, colleges and
universities would be incentivized to develop a more balanced system for
adjudicating cases of sexual assault on campuses. In fact, some states have

230

Id. at 1391–92.
Id. at 1392.
232 Id. at 1398.
233 Id. at 1393.
234 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967). Even though Garrity addressed a countervailing policy
issue of encouraging forthright police officers, Garrity’s holding and reasoning has been extended to other
governmental employees, demonstrating that the Court was not solely concerned with police officer conduct.
See, e.g., Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 488 F.3d 489, 502 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the employer’s
notification that “[e]mployees will furnish information and testify freely and honestly in cases respecting
employment and disciplinary matters” and “[r]efusal to testify . . . in connection with an investigation or hearing
may be ground for disciplinary action” was a “threat of removal sufficient to constitute coercion under Garrity”).
231

MCGOWAN GALLEYPROOFS2

1206

5/30/2017 11:35 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1175

recognized the due process concerns posed by the lack of safeguards in schools’
sexual assault disciplinary procedures and consequently have implemented
various protections to compensate.235 In Arkansas, for example, students have
the right to bring an attorney when appealing a nonacademic suspension of
expulsion.236 North Carolina and North Dakota have passed laws that guarantee
a student’s right to counsel at his or her own expense in public colleges and
universities in nonacademic suspension and expulsion hearings.237
Granting immunity for self-incriminating statements made by accused
students in the college disciplinary procedure would aid in the effort to keep
college investigations separate from criminal investigations.238 Because accused
students would not have to fear that their statements could be used against them
in state court, accused students would feel encouraged to speak more freely to
school officials about alleged misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Increased media reporting on the prevalence of sexual assault and the Obama
Administration’s pressure for colleges and universities to comply with Title IX
initiated sweeping reforms for school disciplinary procedures. While the
importance of combatting rape and sexual violence on college campuses cannot
be overstated, the methods for accomplishing this task must not be too one-sided
as to deprive students of their constitutional rights.
Although a call for the Court to overturn Connelly might seem unlikely, the
dissent’s reasoning adheres to the pre-Connelly values of rational choice and
free will that are of particular interest when courts consider confession cases in
the public employer-employee context. If the Court is unwilling to constrain

235 See Richardson, supra note 11 (explaining different states’ efforts to strike a balance between combatting
rape and ensuring due process).
236 Id.
237 North Dakota Guarantees College Students’ Right to Attorney During Nonacademic Disciplinary
Hearings, CAMPUS SAFETY (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/north_dakota_
guarantees_college_students_right_to_attorney_during_nonacadem.
238 Keeping college investigations and criminal proceedings separate is a legitimate concern, even in the
face of increasing incidents of sexual assault, to ensure that the constitutional rights of both the accused student
and the victim are adequately protected in an educational setting.
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Connelly, states’ efforts to strike an appropriate balance in college sexual assault
disciplinary reforms are especially important.
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